Putin’s Nightmares and the Threat of a Nuclear “Accident”

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 12, No. 12, December 2024 

By Christopher Shove, Ph.D.

A mural of Putin, Hitler, and Stalin with a slogan " No More Time"

A mural of Putin, Hitler, and Stalin with a slogan “No More Time”. Anthony D Barraclough via Flickr.

As Russian losses mount, Putin’s threat of a nuclear incident becomes all the more likely. According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine report dated 10 December 2024, Russian casualties from February 24, 2022 to December 10, 2024 include the following: 755,940 personnel, 9,524 tanks, and 19,596 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). While Ukraine’s estimate may appear high, there is consensus from many intelligence sources that Russian losses are substantial. A recent example is the increase in losses in the Russia Kursk oblast where Ukraine counter-attacked and has occupied since August 6, 2024. Here, Ukrainian soldiers report 10 or more daily waves of Russian attacks on the Kursk battlefield with almost all stopped, resulting in massive Russian losses. As a result, Russia has transferred soldiers from other areas to the Kursk battlefield – with only losses and no gains against Ukraine’s clever tactics. Continue reading

It’s Past Time to Secure the Internet

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 12, No. 11, November 2024 

The image depicts a world globe focusing on America.

Nick Aldwin via Flickr

By Tim Sell

If we’ve learned anything in the last three years, it’s that open borders don’t work. They put American citizens at risk. Why haven’t we learned, over the last thirty years, that an open Internet causes the same problems? I read about problems everyday from Russian hackers and Iranian agents creating election havoc and stealing identities and money. About a year ago, I experienced bank fraud and identity theft. When I reported this to my local police department, I was told nothing could be done,
as the attack came from “overseas” on the Internet.

Continue reading

Putin’s Folly

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 10, No. 2, February 2022

Protestors against 2022 Russia invasion of Ukraine, at the Hachiko square in Shibuya, Japan. Protesters drop the Ukrainian flag over the shoulders and hold up signs.

Protestors against 2022 Russia invasion of Ukraine, at the Hachiko square in Shibuya, Japan. Wikimedia.

Richard Shortt, Ph.D.
Leader of New Zealand’s multi-agency Combined Threat Assessment Group

The work of unravelling Putin’s folly in the Ukraine began February 24 with the firing of the first missiles and artillery shells that signalled his invasion. It will be slow, time-consuming work, assuming no national uprisings in either the Ukraine or Russia by ordinary folks demanding an end to the killing and destruction, or more significant interventions by Western powers – both of which I consider unlikely. It will, in all probability, take longer than the time Putin has left sitting on the Russian imperial throne. But it will happen.

We are currently in what I term the Chaos Phase of the work. This is where invasion leads to death, destruction, despair and defiance. It is the defiance that will ultimately lead us to the next phase, meanwhile, troops and civilians will die, infrastructure will be destroyed and damaged and people on all sides of the issue will watch in stunned horror at what modern warfare and forced occupation means in a modern-day European country.

The Russian forces will emerge victorious. There is very little doubt about that, but not before the Ukrainian efforts deliver martyrs who will fuel the next phase – Resistance. Continue reading

How to bring Russia into INF compliance — without triggering a war

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 7, No. 3, March 2019  

Anna J. Davidson
Scholar and Researcher

A photograph depicts an army vehicle from close-up. An urban landscape appears in the background.

Russian S-400 air defence missile systems roll at Red Square during the Victory Day military parade in Moscow. Source: Dmitriy Fomin via Flickr

ABSTRACT   For all intents and purposes, the prevailing wisdom in both East and West suggests that the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty is lost. On 4 March, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree officially terminating his country’s participation in the INF “until the United States of America rectifies its violations of the said Treaty or until it expires.” This action mirrors that by the United States in early February that accused Russia of violating the Treaty and instigated the six-month withdrawal process. Both of these steps follow five years of continuous effort by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to compel Russia’s compliance with the stipulations of the INF to no avail. As the August deadline approaches, the United States and Russia face three options: reach a mutual agreement on one another’s compliance to preserve the INF, draft a new arms control agreement, or allow the INF to expire and risk a renewed arms race as both countries continue developing their defense capabilities. Despite the wide acceptance of the latter, a potential incentive for Russia to return to INF compliance, and thus preserve the Treaty, exists in the Kremlin’s relationship with Ankara. As a NATO member state, Turkey finds itself in a unique position with the United States as an ally and Russia as a strategic partner. Turkey’s desire to purchase both the American Patriot and the Russian S-400 missile defense systems presents an opportunity to increase the value of Turkey’s partnership with Russia and decrease the significance of Russia’s need to develop missiles noncompliant with the INF. Turkey insists that it will proceed with the purchase of Russia’s S-400 systems regardless of Washington’s willingness (or lack thereof) to offer the American Patriot systems, as the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act currently obstructs the purchase of Russian S-400s by Turkey. Yet, Turkey and Russia are proceeding with the exchange while simultaneously deepening cooperation in the Syria crisis, particularly Idlib. If the United States and NATO leverage Turkey’s request for the Patriot systems and take advantage of Russia’s urge to sell its S-400s to Turkey, the opportunity for a renegotiation and recommitment to the INF Treaty remains within reach.  Continue reading