French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius recently indicated that development would be a priority in Mali as a counterinsurgency strategy. The theory is that after winning the war, an infusion of development funding will solidify gains among the population and strengthen their resolve against Islamist rebels. French and Malian officials are currently in Lyon, France, discussing details of 300 projects that will focus on water, health, education, and job training (BBC, EuroNews).

While providing development to impoverished Malians is intuitively good, the likely small scale of the overall project, combined with its implementation in a conflict zone, pose complications and could even lead to confounding effects. Mali has an overall population of 15.5 million sharing a GDP of $9.6 billion ($619 per capita) (CIA Factbook). While the amount of development funding planned by France has not been revealed, development funding in Afghanistan can be used as a point of comparison: $62 billion over ten years from 2002-2011 (National Defense University), or about $200 per person per year. An equivalent development level for Mali would require $3.1 billion for 2014 alone, which is unlikely given the state of France’s economy.

The impact of $200 of funding per person per year in Mali could actually be negative. Twenty-five percent is probably lost to legitimate administration. Through corruption, government officials could absorb 5-15% of the remaining funding. Through extortion, Islamist rebels could “tax” the development contractors doing the actual construction or service delivery in Northern Mali. This could provide them with access to scarce cash necessary to take their rebellion to a more lethal level. Finally, populations with heightened expectations from advance hearsay of the development projects could have those expectations dashed by the inadequacy of those projects once they reach the villages. While a nice gesture, whatever development funding remains after administration, corruption, and extortion costs (about $120 per capita by my calculation) may seem stingy to a Malian villager who is now intimate with the French rolling around in million-dollar armored vehicles, and streaking across the sky in jets.

On March 15, 2011, popular protests erupted in Syria as part of the Arab Spring. The Syrian regime brutally suppressed the protests, which grew into armed opposition and civil war. President Bashar Hafez al-Assad’s Ba’athist government fought against a splintered but militant opposition. The United Nations tracked atrocities committed on both sides, including more than 70,000 killed (CNN).

Assad obtains most of his political support from the authoritarian regimes in China, Russia, and Iran. The Arab League previously supported him, but as the atrocities mounted, now supports the opposition. There is substantial public support for action against the Syrian regime in the United States, France and Britain. The types of action palatable to the voting public in the United States and Britain, weary of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, do not include intervention. The public in newly-interventionist France does support deploying United Nations troops to Syria. All three countries support economic sanctions, and there is increasing support for supplying opposition groups with military materiel  (Council on Foreign Relations). Political leadership in the United States, France and Britain are responding with proxy war proposals consistent with this public opinion.

Expect limited military materiel support to Syrian rebels from the US, Britain and France in the near future. Due to insufficient public support, this will not include deployment of troops, and will only be sufficient to prolong — not win — the war. Over time, limited and therefore ineffectual military support may lead to increasing public support for deployment. If deployment occurs, expect a quick apparent win by the opposition, which turns into a long (5-15 years) and expensive period of nation-building and civil war as in Iraq and Afghanistan. Increased western military expenditures will improve yields in the defense sector, but increase government debt and taxes. Expect lower economic performance overall as defense expenditures aimed at Syria increase.

Opposition groups that will immediately benefit from western intervention in Syria will solicit such intervention in the short term. However, public opinion in Islamic countries find western intervention highly disagreeable, as do China, Russia and Iran. Expect increased global tensions and Islamic terrorism from western intervention in Syria. Expect Syrian opposition groups to quickly spurn their western benefactors as soon as military and other aid ends.

Today, France joined the UK in publicly threatening to rupture a common approach to European Union (EU) foreign policy by sending arms to Syrian rebels (Bloomberg). This, on the heels of the January 11 unilateral French intervention in Northern Mali. Since the May 2012 election of French President François Hollande, France has increased its political independence with respect to the EU. This distresses Germany, which wants closer political union. Without seeing gains in political unity, Germany could decrease its financial support to the European project (Council on Foreign Relations). This augurs poorly for European monetary union, the value of the Euro, and global economic stability.

Lack of German financial support to Europe would increase the probability that Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, or Spain would be forced out of the Euro. Were this to happen without prior agreement from the rest of the eurozone, the cost to the dropout would be catastrophic in terms of trust and with it, access to money markets. The cost to the remaining eurozone countries would be an increase in eurozone per capita money supply and resulting inflation of the Euro. Confidence in the Euro would fall, and the chance of further dropouts would be reflected in the foreign exchange market. Decreasing confidence and loss of value increases incentives for other EU countries to be the next to leave the Euro, with spiraling downward effects on its value. The massive investment in the Euro — and the amount that could be lost given failure — explains why Germany is willing to prop up the currency through stabilization of economically ailing eurozone members. Ailing eurozone countries milk their wealthier neighbors with the threat of Euro collapse.

Euro collapse is not just a European problem. It would have a disastrous effect on the global economy, including major European trading partners such as the United States and China. Thus, all trading partners with Europe have — at least for economic reasons — a stake in the success of a European common foreign policy. This should be considered when jockeying for short-term diplomatic goals such as arming the opposition in Syria.

Increasing European political integration and unity should give the investor increased confidence in the Euro; decreased integration and unity will have downward effects.  In part because of understandable historical differences based on the subjective experience of World War II, Germany is profoundly leery of military intervention. France and Britain frequently see intervention as an obligation to stop massacre, genocide, and civil war, especially when such intervention involves ancillary benefits such as removing a rogue or terrorist threat. Increased institutional power to overcome foreign policy differences in Europe would assist common foreign policymaking, and thereby improve market confidence in the Euro. Public pronouncements of Britain and France asserting foreign policy independence from the EU are geared towards influencing Germany and other recalcitrant EU states to take the UK-France-Italy approach on Syria. They show that for the moment at least, short-term foreign policy goals are trumping aspirations of a common EU foreign policy, stability of the Euro, and mitigation of risk to the international economy.

Watch for any hedge by the German government against the Euro, which will precede rapid loss of confidence in the Euro and a decrease in German monetary support to the currency union.