Serbia’s EU bid and the Kosovo dialogue

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 2, No. 4, April 2014.

26th MEU Marines are photographed providing security at mass gravesite in Northern Kosovo as members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Forensics Team investigate remains.

26th MEU Marines provide security at mass gravesite in Northern Kosovo as members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Forensics Team investigate remains. The Marines and sailors of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) are helping to enforce the implementation of the military technical agreement and to provide peace and stability to Kosovo during Operation JOINT GUARDIAN. Source: NARA & DVIDS Public Domain Archive.

Raquel Montes Torralba
Foreign Affairs Analyst

With Serbia seeking to join the European Union (EU), as did Croatia in July 2013, European officials have advanced a pre-condition to be resolution of major disputes with Kosovo. In April 2014, Serbia and Kosovo celebrate the first anniversary of an agreement meant to normalize relations. Positive developments include the March 2014 election of a pro-EU majority in Serbia’s parliament, local elections in North Kosovo held in a generally peaceful manner, as well as progress on technical issues such as border control and police transfer. Nevertheless, the political context for 2014 could be derailed by upcoming general elections in Kosovo, the creation of a Kosovo Army, and establishment of a war crimes court for Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian rebels. More particularly, all these factors could impact the creation of a Community of Serb Municipalities, the keystone of the Serbia-Kosovo Agreement. Continue reading

Financial Inclusion, Mobile Banking, and Remittances in Mexico and the Philippines

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 2014.

María Elena Labastida Tovar, Ph.D.
Universidad Anáhuac México Norte

Almendra Ortiz de Zárate, MsC.
Universidad Anáhuac México Norte

Lilianne Isabel Pavón, Ph.D.
Universidad Anáhuac México Norte

Priscilla A. Tacujan, Ph.D.
Corr Analytics, Inc.

Abstract

Figure 1 is a bar graph titled "Annual Economic Growth in Mexico, from 2005 to 2012 (in percentages)"

Figure 1. Annual Economic Growth in Mexico, from 2005 to 2012 (in percentages). Data Source: National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics (INEGI), accessed July 2, 2013, http://www3.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/mexicocifras/.

Remittance senders evaluate the costs and benefits of money transfer services. Two conditions are of paramount interest: low costs and accessibility of use for the sender and receiver. The use of mobile phones (a ubiquitous technology) for sending money, paying for services, and banking is increasingly seen not only as the best option for remittances, but the only one that can fulfill the two conditions above. Due to its ubiquitous nature, access to financial services through mobile phones is growing exponentially, expanding access to more consumers, and readily available to decrease the costs of transferring money globally. This study addresses the use of this ubiquitous technology in two emerging markets: Mexico and the Philippines. It evaluates the impact of the regulatory framework on mobile financial services to provide consumers with greater access to financial services. Continue reading

Shale Gas Race: Political Risk in China, Argentina and Mexico

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 2014.

A global map showing shale gas basins, top reserve holders.

Global shale gas basins, top reserve holders. Source: Reuters, Catherine Trevethan.

Igor Faynzilbert, CFA
Financial Analyst

As the world continues to embrace cleaner and more efficient sources of energy over the next 25 years, natural gas stands to gain a large market share at the expense of less efficient and more pollutant coal and wood. The United States is currently the biggest winner from hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling that allow significantly increased production of shale gas. However, China, Argentina and Mexico are also potential gainers from these new technologies if they manage to overcome political and infrastructure challenges that have considerably slowed development of new gas fields. Continue reading

Election Boycott will Weaken Thailand’s Democrat Party and the PDRC

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 1, No. 8, December 2013.

Anti-government protesters photographed attending a rally outside Government House on December 9, 2013 in Bangkok, Thailand. Photo credit: Sira Anamwong.

Anti-government protesters attend a rally outside Government House on December 9, 2013 in Bangkok, Thailand. Photo credit: Sira Anamwong.

Anders Corr, Ph.D.
Publisher of the Journal of Political Risk

Thailand’s opposition Democrat Party, as well as the supporting People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) protest movement, will weaken due to strategic missteps of boycotting elections and attempting to block other parties from registering with Thailand’s electoral commission. It should be obvious that elections and elected position are a potent source of influence for both political parties and social movements. Boycotting elections invariably backfires as a strategy because it increases distance between the challenger who wields the strategy, and the electoral source of influence. Election boycotts led to landslide victories for incumbents in Trinidad and Tobago (1971), Jamaica (1983), Burkina Faso (1991), Ghana (1992), Togo (1993), Ethiopia (1994), Mali (1997), Algeria (1999), Gambia (2002), Guinea(2003), Azerbaijan (2003), Iraq (2005) and Venezuela (2005). The incumbent also won the boycotted 3 April 2006 elections in Thailand. These were later invalidated and followed by a coup, resulting in the instability that continues in Thailand today. As in prior boycotts, expect the incumbent political party, in this case Prime Minister Shinawatra’s Pheu Thai, to take advantage of the challenger’s absence to consolidate the Pheu Thai’s parliamentary majority and public image. Expect increased dissatisfaction among the opposition and military, and resulting political instability.1 Continue reading

Rise of Environmental NGOs in China: Official Ambivalence and Contested Messages

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 1, No. 8, December 2013.

Figure 1 is a bar graph titled "Registered NGOs (Civil Organizations) in China 1988 to 2009." and shows an upward trend.

Figure 1. Registered NGOs (Civil Organizations) in China 1988 to 2009. Data source: Xu Ying and Zhao Litao, 2013.

Ruge Gao
Cornell University

With China’s impressive economic growth over the past few decades has come an environmental cost that reaches from the countryside to the capital.[1]  While some Chinese economists believe the lack of environmental regulation encourages uninhibited growth, the Chinese State Environmental Protection Agency and State Statistics Bureau have produced statistics that indicate that environmental damages have decreased growth by three percent.[2] Triggered most prominently by the 1998 Yangtze River Floods, the number of Chinese environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) began growing around 2000 and experienced explosive growth within the last decade. According to Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs statistics,[3] in 2008 China had approximately 212,000 social groups, with 5,330 being of the environmental variety. Many Chinese ENGOs are in the public eye, but must simultaneously satisfy international donors and local government officials in order to survive. Continue reading