Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 2, No. 11, November 2014.

The Kremlin star, 2008. Source: Andrew Kuznetsov via Flickr.

Rhoads Cannon
Founder

The impact of history leaves an indelible handprint upon the construction of ideational beliefs. With the fall of the Soviet Empire in East and Central Europe, there was a mixed sense of jubilation among disparate peoples of the post-Soviet space. Former US National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, rightly stipulates that the disintegration of the Soviet Union “created a black hole in the center of Eurasia,”[1] and today’s post-911 world continues to endure the multifarious impact of this transitional paradigm. Undoubtedly, the dismemberment of 27,000 nuclear arms, three freshwater fleets, and four million men in arms was and chiefly remains a psychosomatic and socio-economic challenge of the highest degree.[2] Although Kremlin observers debate the extent to which Russian decision-making is conceptualized solely by the Kremlin, it is blatantly clear that Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and his inner-coterie have not come to grips with the loss of largess via the Soviet legacy.

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 2, No. 10, October 2014.

Vice President of the European Commission Catherine Margaret Ashton talks with US Secretary of State John Kerry at the Coburg Palais in Vienna, on July 13, 2014, for talks with foreign ministers from the six powers negotiating with Tehran on its nuclear programWestern foreign ministers from the P5+1 group of nations are expected in Austria to try and resolve differences with Iran over its nuclear program, a week before the deadline to strike a deal. Source: European Parliament via Flickr.

Anders Corr, Ph.D.
Publisher of the Journal of Political Risk

Iran wants at least 7,000 centrifuges for its uranium enrichment capacity, it made clear in negotiations with the United States and other members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany (the P5+1). Iran is currently spinning only 10,000 of its 20,000 centrifuges, and thus a drop to 7,000 centrifuges would not significantly slow its current rapid progress towards nuclear weapons capabilities. The current negotiations are hinging on a dispute between Iran, which wants at least 7,000 centrifuges, and the P5+1, which wants a limit of of 4,000 Iranian centrifuges.  Also impeding an agreement is that Iran is suspected to have already tested a nuclear weapon device, and has not agreed to an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) request for full monitoring and verification, including at its nuclear military site in Parchin.

The Journal of Political Risk received this information during an exclusive interview with a reliable official source on Wednesday October 23. JPR could not verify the official’s information, since the official requested anonymity. The official followed up with a detailed explanation, quoted below. Continue reading →

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 2, No. 10, October 2014.

Proton-M rocket blasts off from the launch pad at Baikonur cosmodrome. Russia’s space agency says three GLONASS-M satellites have been put into orbit by the Proton-M rocket. The satellites launched Thursday will join Russia’s Global Navigation Satellite System, or GLONASS. Source: Roscosmos via Flickr.

Darya Vakulenko
National Endowment for Democracy

Vladimir Putin’s most recent trip to Latin America is a sign of an ongoing Russian push to expand its influence and diversify foreign allies. In mid-July, the Russian president visited Cuba, Nicaragua, Argentina and ended his trip in Brazil, where the BRICS countries gathered for their 6th annual summit.

Throughout his tour, Putin discussed similar topics: assistance in developing and exploring new energy sources; installation of Global Satellite Navigation System (GLONASS), the Russian response to the U.S. Global Positioning System (G.P.S.); and agreements on boosting the presence of official Russian media in Latin America.

On energy, Putin and his team showed real determination to strengthen Russia’s position in the region. In Argentina, Rosatom, a Russian state-owned nuclear agency, submitted a proposal to construct the third unit for the Atucha nuclear plant. [1],[2]  In Cuba, Russian state-oil companies were the most active of the delegation. Zarubezhneft  presented plans to develop oil fields west of Boca de Jaruca, and Rosneft will search for offshore deepwater oil.[3] Additionally, the Russian energy holding company, Inter RAO, will build four energy blocks for Maximo Gomez, an electrical plant in East Havana.[4]

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 2, No. 8, August 2014.

Barack and Micelle Obama en route to Martha’s Vineyard. The president is doing something unusual with his summer vacation on Martha’s Vineyard: He’ll come back to Washington midway through the getaway to attend White House meetings. Source: GetArchive.

Priscilla Tacujan, PhD
Independent Consultant 

Critics from all sides of America’s political spectrum are either angry or exasperated over President Obama’s handling of foreign policy. Major U.S. newspapers, including those that endorsed his presidency, have recently published scathing editorials about how weak U.S. leadership has become. In the face of unfolding international crises, Western allies are forced to take a stance ahead of the President, sensing a lack of U.S. leadership and resolve that used to be the hallmark of American power in the world. U.S. leadership has come to mean mobilizing the coalition of nations, lending credence to the phrase “leading from behind.”

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In this May 1, 2011, image released by the White House and digitally altered by the source to obscure the details of a document in front of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, right with hand covering mouth, President Barack Obama, second from left, Vice President Joe Biden, left, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, right, and members of the national security team watch an update of the mission against Osama bin Laden in the White House Situation Room in Washington. As the world now knows well Obama ultimately decided to launch the raid on the Abbottabad compound that killed bin Laden, though faced with a level of widespread skepticism from a veteran intelligence analyst, shared with other top-level officials, which nearly scuttled the raid. That process reflected a sea change within the U.S. spy community, one that embraces debate to avoid “slam-dunk” intelligence in tough national security decisions. Source: White House Press.

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 2, No. 7, July 2014.

Lauren Hickok
Fellow

I. Introduction

On May 1, 2011, President Obama declared: “Tonight I can report to the American people and the world that the United States has conducted an operation that killed Osama bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda, and a terrorist who’s responsible for the murder of thousands of innocent men, women, and children.”[1] The president had made a bold choice in authorizing Operation Neptune Spear.  His decision rested on an appraisal of several factors, which together determined the level of political risk associated with the mission: (1) the accuracy of the intelligence; (2) the ability of SEAL Team Six to succeed despite unexpected challenges; and (3) the costs to US national security, relative to the benefits. The president remained committed to countering al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, involved himself in the planning for Neptune Spear, and took on considerable risk in order to succeed. In final review, the president’s decision was not easy, or even prudent—but it succeeded.

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