Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 3, No. 5, May 2015.
Anders Corr, Ph.D.
Publisher of the Journal of Political Risk
Matthew Michaelides
Editor of the Journal of Political Risk
In mid-April, China started building a military air strip in the South China Sea,[1] and to the extent that air strips are replicated on China’s other occupied South China Sea atolls and shoals, it will dramatically increase the effective range of its military aircraft and rocketry, including surveillance, search and rescue, helicopter, transport, bomber, and fighter aircraft, as well as its surface-to-air missile (SAM) and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities.
Chinese air assets advantaged by the South China Sea air strips include the Chengdu J-10[2] and J-11 fourth-generation multi-purpose fighter jets[3], the Soviet-made S-400 SAMs[4], the twin-propeller Y-12 Turbo Panda maritime patrol[5] and surveillance aircraft, ASW aircraft and helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles such as the Pterodactyl Wing Loong[6], and cruise missiles such as the Chang Zian (Also spelled Chang Jian, or Long Sword)[7], with a range of up to 2,000 kilometers.[8]
With its weaponry closer than ever to the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia, not to mention potential refueling of bombers and tankers, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF)[9] will have improved air power projection capabilities towards Australia and India. SAMs based on the new islands will significantly augment already-existing naval SAMs such as the HQ-9 (with an operating range of up to 100km).[10]