Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 4, No. 6, June 2016

1876 Tilden-Hayes Election, February 1877. Source: Derrick Bostrom via Flickr.

Bhakti Mirchandani
Senior Vice President at An Alternative Investment Management Firm

Abstract

Popular resentment of changes in the economy and of the political elites administering some of those changes is palpable during this year’s presidential campaign.[1]  Public distrust is rife: the electorate views narrow moneyed interests as increasingly driving public policy and the legislative process as broken.[2]  At the same time that American voters are “tired of Washington politicians,”[3] the legacies of Presidents without elected office experience before being sworn into the Oval Office demonstrates the difficulty for outsiders to be effective Presidents.  Numerous academics, such as Arthur Schlesinger, have dedicated decades and thousands of pages to presidential backgrounds and legacies, and every four years the media examines the credentials of prospective and prior Presidents.  This article is a short opinion piece about the shortcomings of past outsider Presidents.  Their flaws ranged from cognitive bias to tolerance of corruption and from excessive use of clandestine plots to lack of political skill.  Only two of the five outsiders–Dwight Eisenhower and Ulysses Grant–were reelected to second terms.

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 4, No. 6, June 2016

The United States, Japan and India participate in a joint military operation. The U.S. says at least one Chinese ship tailed the USS John C. Stennis daily during its recent cruise through the South China Sea, although no hostile incidents were reported. Source: U.S. Navy.

Nong Hong^[1]

Abstract

The existing territorial and maritime disputes in South China Sea have been pending for decades. Despite tremendous efforts on conflict management, the settlement of the decades-old maritime dispute in the South China Sea seems to be politically deadlocked. The Philippines, losing patience and confidence on negotiations on various levels, has stepped forward by utilizing the arbitration procedures under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and sued China on January 22, 2013. This paper attempts to answer such questions as, will the arbitration case resolve the dispute between the Philippines and China; what is the political and legal consequence following this; what is the impact of the Philippine’s arbitration initiative for the negotiation and drafting process of the Code of Conduct; what is the value and role of the UNCLOS in maritime dispute settlements in the South China Sea; and, in a broader sense, is the recent escalating tension in the South China Sea a consequence, explicitly or implicitly of the arbitration case. The author argues that despite the value ascribed  to the compulsory dispute settlement under UNCLOS, the South China Sea Arbitration Case does not resolve the problem between the two countries. Even more complicated, some have blamed the Philippines for triggering the negative reaction from China, which will lead to an uncertain post-arbitration situation. The author raises a question: Is the Philippines’ use of UNCLOS arbitration a genuine attempt to resolve its maritime dispute with China? Or is it merely a political game of international law?

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 4, No. 6, June 2016

Traditional Geopolitical Risks for GSCs (Source: PWC – Transportation & Logistics 2030 [p. 17])

Abstract

The geopolitical underpinnings of economic globalization are changing. Transnational corporations (TNCs) and their network of supply-chains have to operate in a business environment in which emerging geo-economic forces are interacting with shifting geopolitical realities. The challenges for geopolitical risk management will increase in a world of multiple poles of economic power.  TNCs and firms operating globally will need to develop a sense of strategic awareness of the new geo-economic spheres of influence and the systemic geopolitical risks reshaping the interdependence of countries and companies in the global marketplace. Corporate geopolitics need to be an essential component of business strategy.

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 4, No. 5, May 2016

Fiery Cross Reef, Spratly Islands. This is one of the islands that the Chinese government has contrasted in the South China Sea. Source: Flickr.

Sean R. Liedman

Abstract:  

Since the end of World War II, U.S. strategy towards China has tacked between three central policy themes: containment, cooperative engagement, and competition. Additionally, a fourth unstated strategic theme undergirds the above: prevailing in the event of conflict. Even though they are fundamentally conflicting ideas, the principles of cooperation and competition remain central tenets of the U.S. strategy versus China today, and the tension between those two principles has been on full display in the South China Sea since 2012. Looking to the future, the United States has three broad policy options vis-à-vis recent Chinese activities in the South China Sea: 1) “Continued concession” to Chinese territorial expansion in the South China Sea in the interest of achieving broader strategic objectives, 2) “Freeze the status quo”, or 3) “Roll back” Chinese expansion and excessive sovereignty claims. Key observable metrics will indicate which of these policy options is being followed, the range of diplomatic and military strategies to achieve those policy aims, and their likely outcomes.

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 4, No. 3, March 2016

A Syrian refugee camp in Turkey, 2016. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon on Friday called on the Syrian government to “stop the violence in the name of humanity”, during a visit to the Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan, close to the Syrian border. Source: European Parliament via Flickr.

Bhakti Mirchandani
Senior Vice President at An Alternative Investment Management Firm

As the war in Syria hit its five-year mark this past Tuesday, the European strategy for managing the nearly 1 million Syrian refugees[1] seeking asylum in Europe is not working.  While most of the refugees that arrived in Europe in 2015 left Syria last year, others are leaving countries of first asylum Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon for Europe after years of hardship.[2]  By way of background, first asylum countries are those that allow refugees to enter their territory for temporary asylum while waiting for resettlement or repatriation.  The European Commission is hoping that another deal with Turkey and stronger Schengen Area external border controls will tackle the biggest European refugee crisis since World War II.  As long as Syrian refugees lack the assistance they need in Syria and countries of first asylum, they will continue to make perilous journeys to Europe[3] on unseaworthy boats.[4]  While the EU and Turkey negotiate a controversial refugee exchange program and the European Commission weighs the establishment of a “European Border and Coast Guard” with a larger budget and more authority than current EU management agency Frontex,[5]  the US should fund financially sustainable relief and development to Jordan in parallel with its extensive humanitarian and military aid.  Jordan’s commitment to peace and moderation in the Middle East and cooperation with the US on security matters and counterterrorism make it a vital US ally.

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