Good Hombres (and Mujeres): Let’s Modernize NAFTA

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 5, No. 9, September 2017

A gold statue of an angel is photographed against the backdrop of a blue sky. The photograph is taken from below and the angel appears to be on the top of a tower.

Credit: Bhakti Mirchandani.

Bhakti Mirchandani
Senior Vice President at An Alternative Investment Management Firm

Mexico is the U.S.’s third largest trading partner[1] and second largest export destination.[2]    Trade representatives from the U.S., Canada, and Mexico said that they made progress in the second round of NAFTA renegotiations (September 1-5 in Mexico City),[3] with a third round scheduled for September 23-27 in Ottawa, Canada.[4]  President Trump’s August 22nd statement at a rally in Phoenix that the US would “probably end up terminating NAFTA at some point”[5] looms over this progress.  Instead, the administration should acknowledge that withdrawing from NAFTA is untenable.

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Perspectives for development of China-EU relations in the infrastructure investment sector: a case study of COVEC’s investment in Poland

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 5, No. 8, August 2017

Polish President Andrzej Duda is photographed exchanging red folders with Chinese President XI Jinping. The Chinese flag is visible in the background.

Polish President Andrzej Duda with Chinese President XI Jinping, 2016. Source: Wikimedia Commons.


Paulina Kanarek
Oxford University

In 2009 China Overseas Engineering Group (COVEC) was the first Chinese company to win a public works contract in a member state of the European Union. Two years later COVEC decided to withdraw from Poland and its failure to construct a section of the A2 motorway between Warsaw and Łódź brought up questions regarding access to the EU’s public procurement market by third countries.

This research explores the implications of COVEC’s investment for bilateral relations between China and Poland. Through analysis of this particular case study of the unsuccessful entrance to the EU infrastructure market, this work attempts to uncover whether the fault lies in the communication gap between European and Chinese actors and zero-sum mentality or it is a case of policy failure.

This study will reveal the particular model of operations that the Chinese companies try to pursue in Europe, basing on their previous experiences in the African construction market. By showing that the model which relies on offering the lowest bid and then renegotiating the contract cannot work due to the European Union’s legal framework and Polish domestic laws, this evidence-based research will argue that COVEC’s investment was a classic example of project management failure.

Furthermore, this research aims at casting light on the broader context of the political economy of China’s relations with the European Union. Following the national interest while adhering to its obligations as a member state of the EU, Poland serves as a good example to show the complexity of relations between the PRC and highly fragmented EU.

Through qualitative research, including elite interviews, this work intends to fill in the gap in academic research on China’s relations with the Central and Eastern European states, assessing whether there is space for progress in China-EU relations in the infrastructure investment sector.

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Invite Taiwan Navy To RIMPAC Exercise In Hawaii

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 5, No. 7, July 2017

The nose of the guided-missile cruiser USS Princeton (CG 59) is photographed following behind Chinese Navy multi-role frigate Hengshui (572), guided-missile destroyer Xian (153) and replenishment ship Gaoyouhu (966).

The guided-missile cruiser USS Princeton (CG 59) steams behind Chinese Navy multi-role frigate Hengshui (572), guided-missile destroyer Xian (153) and replenishment ship Gaoyouhu (966) while participating in maneuvering drills during Rim of the Pacific, 2016. A Chinese navy fleet, including five ships (the missile destroyer Xi’an, the missile frigate Hengshui, the supply ship Gaoyouhu, the hospital ship Peace Ark, the submarine rescue vessel Changdao), three helicopters, a marine squad and a diving squad with 1,200 officers and soldiers, set sail from Zhoushan to Hawaii to join the RIMPAC 2016 on June 15. It is the second time that Chinese navy has participated in RIMPAC, a multilateral naval exercises led by the USA and held every two years. Source: Picryl.

Anders Corr, Ph.D.
Publisher of the Journal of Political Risk

In 1971, the U.S. started holding international naval exercises in Hawaii, and called them RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific). We invited our closest allies to participate. Now, the U.S. Navy is inviting not only allies, but Russia and China as well. Since a brief thaw in the 1990s, Russia and China are increasingly acting as adversaries rather than responsible international partners to the U.S. Most recently, China seems to have helped rather than stopped North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. It is time to invite Taiwan, not China, to RIMPAC.

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China Expert: I’m Drunk

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 5, No. 7, July 2017

Beijing partiers are photographed in black and white dozing off at a bar on tables full of empty bottles.

Beijing partiers doze off at a bar, 2013. Source: Andrea La Rosa via Flickr.

Anders Corr
Publisher of the Journal of Political Risk

The following conversation between myself and a drunk China expert, who published a well-reviewed book on China recently, covers a wide-ranging set of topics, including the hard-to-decipher policy intentions of the U.S. and China. The conversation, which occurred by email starting Friday night, April 21, is sometimes humorous, and may be politically incorrect to some. But it succinctly and candidly addresses critical themes of U.S.-China relations, and touches on the politics of China analysis in the U.S. and Europe.

The expert, once he sobered up, gamely gave me permission to publish the exchange, but not to use his name. “I don’t want to be seen as a panda hugger,” he said, “because I’m not.”

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Nuclear Deterrence and Four Types of Force: Definitive, Coercive, Catalytic, and Expressive

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 5, No. 6, June 2017

Four soldiers are photographed standing and waving on a military tank holding a missile at a Victory Day military parade.

Victory Day military parade, North Korea, 2013. Source: Stefan Krasowski via Wikimedia Commons.

Captain Robert C. Rubel
USN (Ret)

North Korea’s drive to attain a nuclear warfare capability is currently on the front burner in the Pentagon, and is a driver of tensions in East Asia. This has precipitated plenty of dialogue in the national security community, including on the issue of extended deterrence, the policy of the US that threatens nuclear response if an ally is attacked with nuclear weapons. One input from a former colleague at the Naval War College was the final catalyst that got me tapping on the keys. First, he quoted one of his scholars as saying that the real question concerning nuclear weapons “… is whether strategic nuclear forces have any genuine relevance today in the context of deterrence and warfighting, or whether they’re troublesome legacy weapons of a bygone era.” In a subsequent email he said that he was “interested in deterrence stopping all wars, not just nuclear.” It may be that the general umbrella of nuclear deterrence did suppress some wars that might have otherwise taken place during the decades after 1945, but it is almost impossible to know. However, my colleague’s faith in the utility of the manifold uses of deterrence is not that distant from those who advocate tailored deterrence, which is a scaled or graduated deterrence structure that includes the option of preemptive strikes.[1] Tailored deterrence to some extent reflects the logic behind the DoD concept of flexible deterrent options (FDO), which are defined as “…a wide range of interrelated responses that begin with deterrent oriented actions carefully tailored to produce a desired effect.”[2] In my view, such policies would incur considerable risk, as they ascribe, in an a priori manner, effects on an opponent’s political decision making and strategic planning processes in lieu of any specific intelligence (frequently) and certainly without any historical track record, especially in the nuclear arena. In this short article I will discuss a different way to analyze deterrence and gain insight into the thought processes of my colleague.

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