Meaningless Medals: Infantry in Afghanistan

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 8, No. 1, January 2019 

Heath B. Hansen

U.S. Army

An army vehicle appears in the foreground, with destroyed, cement buildings in the background.

Circa January 2006, during a mission on the way back to Gardez, Afghanistan. An IED was planted in the road on the K-G Pass (Khost-Gardez). The author, SPC Heath B. Hansen, is in the turret of the humvee, behind an M-240B machine gun. In the background, 1st Platoon, C company, 2/504 PIR, 82nd Airborne inspects the site of the IED explosion from moments prior.

March 2006. My tour was over. I had survived. No more fire-fights. No more IED’s. No more raids. No more rocket-attacks. I was going home. Many servicemen spend time in-country without ever leaving “the wire” (the safety of the walls, fortifications  and/or razor-wire of their base). As an infantryman, I basically lived outside the wire. Being shot at, getting hit by roadside bombs, capturing Taliban fighters, etc., was just part of the job. There was no special recognition, accolades or atta-boys conferred upon me. Infantrymen just do what is expected of them.

We had flown out of Bagram Air Base and landed a little over an hour later at Manas Air Base located in Northern Kyrgyzstan. Our plane touched down and we were escorted to large, white, “clamshell” tents, designed for units in transit. My squad found cots immediately next to each other and dropped our gear. It was official, we were no longer in Afghanistan. We had completed the first leg of our journey back to Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

I woke up to a dark tent the following morning. Small, ambient lights pierced the darkness from laptop computers on soldier’s cots randomly distributed throughout the clamshell. “Hansen, grab your weapon, we’re gonna get chow,” my team leader loudly whispered. “Roger that,” I replied. Even though we were no longer in a combat zone, we had to have our sensitive items (weapons, night-vision goggles, optics, etc.) with us at all times. I grabbed my gear and headed to the chow hall with my fire-team. I was hungry.

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Huawei and China: Not Just Business as Usual

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 8, No. 1, January 2019 

A Huawei mobile smartphone is photographed close-up. The home screen is visible.

Huawei at Mobile World Congress, Barcelona, 2015. Source: Karlis Dambrans via Flickr.

Douglas Black

Technology Journalist

To the average consumer around the world, Huawei is likely thought of as a Chinese company that makes nice phones — a “Chinese Apple” of sorts. The average American consumer might associate the firm as one that makes nice phones but, for some vague, political reasons, is not trustworthy. As of early December, the average Canadian consumer might recognize Huawei as the company at the focus of some political gamesmanship between the US, Canada, and China. All of these lay-interpretations are indeed valid, but there is a great deal more going on than revealed by a cursory glance. This article is intended as a brief explainer of Huawei’s history and current market position, the importance of the company to the ruling Communist Party and their strategic goals, and the far-reaching implications of the outcome of the arrest of Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou.

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Senate Undermines America as an Alliance Partner: The Resolution to Ban US Military Assistance in Yemen

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 7, No. 12, December 2018 

Rebels are photographed in uniform brandishing weapons and posters from close-up.

Rebels brandishing weapons rally in Sanaa, Yemen, 2015. Source: Flickr.

William R. Hawkins

International Economics and National Security Consultant

Those who pushed the U.S. Senate to adopt Senate Joint Resolution 54 (S.J.Res.54), “A joint resolution to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress” in mid-December sought to avoid any mention of the strategic importance of Yemen, the nature of the civil war that has been raging there, or the support Iran has been giving the Shia Houthi rebels who started the conflict. Instead, the resolution aimed only at the U.S.-Saudi alliance and the Saudi-led coalition that is fighting to defend the internationally recognized Yemen government. No American combat units are involved in the Yemen conflict. The U.S. has been providing intelligence and logistical support to give a critical edge to the coalition forces that are doing the actual fighting.

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Chinese Influence and Engagement in Australia and Japan: an Interview with Clive Hamilton

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 7, No. 12, December 2018 

Below is a short interview with Clive Hamilton over email with Anders Corr, October 8-9, 2018.  It covers Hamilton’s views on engagement with China, and the effects of Hamilton’s new book, Silent Invas

Clive Hamilton is photographed close-up from below. The top of a podium is visible at the bottom of the photograph.

Clive Hamilton delivers a speech, 2009. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

ion: China’s Influence in Australia, in Australia and Japan.

JPR: What has the reaction to your book been so far? Will Australia take the tough actions necessary to effectively decrease Chinese influence and intellectual property theft there?

 

Hamilton: My book has played a role in raising public awareness, which in turn has increased pressure on the Australian government to take protective measures. A range of legislated and administrative measures have been put in place, with the new foreign interference law at their centre. My book was an immediate best-seller, reflecting the hunger of many Australians for an explanation of the new situation.

 

JPR: What are the benefits of engagement? Presumably the West obtains information from Chinese nationals overseas just as the Chinese obtain information that they send back to the People’s Republic of China (PRC)? Who gets the better end of this deal? Sub-questions would address two-way intelligence and two-way scientific information.

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Incurring Strategic Risk in the East Asian Littoral: On What Basis?

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 7, No. 12, December 2018 

A world globe is photographed from below. It focused on the South China Sea region.

Globe displaying the South China Sea. China claims nearly all of the South China Sea — a vast tract of water through which a huge chunk of global shipping passes. The Philippines, Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam have competing claims to parts of the sea, which is believed to harbour significant oil and gas deposits. Source: Adam Jones via Flickr.

Captain Robert C. Rubel

USN (Ret)

Recently, two US Navy ships conducted a transit of the Taiwan Straits in an exercise of freedom of navigation.  Right now, US naval forces can conduct freedom of navigation exercises throughout most of the East Asian littoral, including the South China Sea (SCS) without serious fear that they will provoke open hostilities with the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), but as the PRC builds up its forces and gains more confidence, such an escalation may become a distinct possibility.  China started building up its “islands” in 2014, and at the time the US did nothing to stop it.  The Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled in the Philippines’ favor in 2015 over the status of Scarborough Shoal and other SCS features, but China ignored the ruling and the US did nothing to enforce the ruling.  Now Beijing has its “great wall of SAMs” there and it will likely take war to change things.  If China decides in the future to threaten or use force to enforce its claims to the entirety of the SCS as sovereign territory, there will be considerable finger-pointing in Washington concerning “who lost the South China Sea.” US inaction concerning the buildup could be attributed to misdiagnosis of Chinese intent or even a desire to accommodate what was seen as strategically harmless initiatives; however one potential explanation that has implications for future decision making is that the Obama Administration did not feel it had the backing of the international community and more specifically the support of regional countries to take action that would risk war.

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