In this May 1, 2011, image released by the White House and digitally altered by the source to obscure the details of a document in front of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, right with hand covering mouth, President Barack Obama, second from left, Vice President Joe Biden, left, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, right, and members of the national security team watch an update of the mission against Osama bin Laden in the White House Situation Room in Washington. As the world now knows well Obama ultimately decided to launch the raid on the Abbottabad compound that killed bin Laden, though faced with a level of widespread skepticism from a veteran intelligence analyst, shared with other top-level officials, which nearly scuttled the raid. That process reflected a sea change within the U.S. spy community, one that embraces debate to avoid “slam-dunk” intelligence in tough national security decisions. Source: White House Press.
Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 2, No. 7, July 2014.
Lauren Hickok
Fellow
I. Introduction
On May 1, 2011, President Obama declared: “Tonight I can report to the American people and the world that the United States has conducted an operation that killed Osama bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda, and a terrorist who’s responsible for the murder of thousands of innocent men, women, and children.”[1] The president had made a bold choice in authorizing Operation Neptune Spear. His decision rested on an appraisal of several factors, which together determined the level of political risk associated with the mission: (1) the accuracy of the intelligence; (2) the ability of SEAL Team Six to succeed despite unexpected challenges; and (3) the costs to US national security, relative to the benefits. The president remained committed to countering al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, involved himself in the planning for Neptune Spear, and took on considerable risk in order to succeed. In final review, the president’s decision was not easy, or even prudent—but it succeeded.
