Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 4, No. 2, February 2016

Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond (L), and President Xi Jinping (R) in London, 2015. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Kerry Brown, Ph.D.
King’s College, London

Abstract

This paper takes the example of the Chinese claims on the South China Sea, particularly since the appointment of Xi Jinping as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China in late 2012, and looks at the ways in which the Party and the government interact over foreign policy issues, along with how others contribute to this process. It shows that the Party leadership works through articulation of highly abstract macro policy goals, issuing high-level guidance for state, military, corporate and public entities without risking specific details. There is then some space for these “lower bodies” to negotiate and create their own standpoint. This does not mean that the process is solely top-down. What it does mean is that the Party under Xi has a dynamic process by which it allows voices within society to contribute to the formulation of policy in an iterative manner. It also shows how for the Xi leadership the South China Sea is part of a process to establish other forms of legitimacy beyond those simply described as economic. In this way, the Party is able to present itself as the restorer of national pride and rejuvenation and gain immense political capital from this. In this context, the South China Sea is as much a domestic issue as a foreign policy one, something that is often missed in external analysis of this issue.

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 2016

Two Filipino fishermen signal they are in distress to Sailors from USS Mustin (DDG 89) after their fishing boat was disabled in the South China Sea. Fishing rights in this region continue to be contested. Source: U.S. Pacific Fleet via Flickr.

Leonardo Bernard

Summary

One of the most important disputes that exist between states surrounding the South China Sea is over fishing rights, as most of the states bordering the South China Sea assert an exclusive right to fish in parts of it. For example, the Philippines and Vietnam claim that they have an exclusive right over fisheries resources in the waters within 200 nautical miles (M) of their respective mainland coasts. China also declares the right to exploit fisheries resources in the South China Sea, but not only in the waters within 200 M from its mainland coast and from the Paracel Islands. By using the ‘U-shaped line’, China’s claim extends beyond any possible exclusive economic zone (EEZ) limits that can be generated by its mainland and by any islands in the South China Sea over which it claims sovereignty. China, however, has not clarified the meaning of the U-shaped line map, nor the maritime zones generated by the islands in the South China Sea over which it claims sovereignty. Continue reading →

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 3, No. 12, December 2015.

Below is the speech delivered by H.E. Ambassador Katalin Bogyay, Permanent Representative of Hungary to the UN in New York City on 20^th October, 2015 at the Reception on the occasion of the commemoration of the 23 October, 1956 revolution.

Your Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Dear Friends,

Security Council adopts historic resolution on youth, peace and security.  December 2015. UN Photo/Amanda Voisard

In the music of Egmont overture, Op. 84. Ludwig van Beethoven, one of the greatest composers of mankind expressed his own political concerns through the exaltation of the heroic sacrifice of a man condemned to death for having taken a valiant stand against oppression. It was composed during the period of the Napoleonic Wars, at a time when the French Empire had extended its domination over most of Europe.

The subject of the music and dramatic narrative is the life and heroism of a 16th-century Dutch nobleman, the Count of Egmont.

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 3, No. 12, December 2015.

Scott Atran
Freelance Journalist

A. What ISIS Wants

Members of Scott Atran’s research team, Lydia Wilson and Hoshang Waziri, run an experiment with a Peshmerga fighter (front) near Mahmour on the frontlines between Mosul and Erbil in Northern Iraq, about 1km from ISIS positions. You can see fusion cards (pairs of circles) and formidability cards (bodies from smaller and weaker to bigger and stronger) in the experiments. March 2015. Photo credit: Scott Atran.

The following are axioms drawn from The Management of Chaos-Savagery (Idarat at-Tawahoush, required reading for every ISIS political, religious and military leader, or amir), and from the February 2015 editorial in Dabiq (online ISIS publication), on “The Extinction of the Gray Zone.” ISIS’s actions have been, and likely will continue to be, consistent with these axioms:

• Work to expose the weakness of the so-called Great Powers by pushing them to abandon the media psychological war and war by proxy until they fight directly.
• Draw these powers into military conflict. Seek the confrontations that will bring them to fight in our regions on our terms.
• Diversify the strikes and attack soft targets – tourist areas, eating places, places of entertainment, sports events, and so forth — that cannot possibly be defended everywhere. Disperse the infidels’ resources and drain them to the greatest extent possible, and so undermine people’s faith in the ability of their governments to provide security, most basic of all state functions.
• Target the young, and especially the disaffected, who tend to rebel against authority, are eager for self-sacrifice and are filled with idealism; and let inert organizations and their leaders foolishly preach moderation.
• Motivate the masses to fly to regions that we manage, by eliminating the “Gray Zone” between the true believer and the infidel, which most people, including most Muslims, currently inhabit. Use so-called “terror attacks” to help Muslims realize that non-Muslims hate Islam and want to harm all who practice it, to show that peacefulness gains Muslims nothing but pain.
• Use social media to inspire sympathizers abroad to violence. Communicate the message: Do what you can, with whatever you have, wherever you are, whenever possible.
• Pay attention to what works to hold the interest of people, especially youth, in the lands of the Infidel [e.g., television ratings, box office receipts, music and video charts], and use what works as templates to carry our righteous messages and calls to action under the black banner.

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 3, No. 9, September 2015.

Construction at Fiery Cross Reef as of November 2014. Source: CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative and Digital Globe.

Gregory B. Poling
Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies/Pacific Partners Initiative

Abstract

There has been an explosion of interest in the U.S. policy community regarding the South China Sea disputes, but that interest has too often resulted in oversimplifications and haphazard recommendations regarding how the United States should respond to Chinese activities in disputed waters. Not every action that could be taken should be taken. In order to respond effectively to increasing tensions, U.S. policymakers must clearly identify U.S. long-term strategic goals and gear policy responses toward achieving them. This paper argues that the United States’ top interest in the South China Sea is the preservation of the global maritime commons, and its eventual goal must therefore be to see China clarify its ambiguous “nine-dash line” claim so that the claimants can reach a long-term agreement on managing the disputes that is consistent with international law. Building partner capacity and boosting U.S. presence in order to prevent other claimants from being steamrolled by Chinese bullying before such a resolution can be effected is an important part of that strategy, but it is not the long-term goal. The paper concludes with a number of recommended policy responses the United States should take in order to further its strategic goals.

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