Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 4, No. 6, June 2016
Nong Hong[1]
Abstract
The existing territorial and maritime disputes in South China Sea have been pending for decades. Despite tremendous efforts on conflict management, the settlement of the decades-old maritime dispute in the South China Sea seems to be politically deadlocked. The Philippines, losing patience and confidence on negotiations on various levels, has stepped forward by utilizing the arbitration procedures under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and sued China on January 22, 2013. This paper attempts to answer such questions as, will the arbitration case resolve the dispute between the Philippines and China; what is the political and legal consequence following this; what is the impact of the Philippine’s arbitration initiative for the negotiation and drafting process of the Code of Conduct; what is the value and role of the UNCLOS in maritime dispute settlements in the South China Sea; and, in a broader sense, is the recent escalating tension in the South China Sea a consequence, explicitly or implicitly of the arbitration case. The author argues that despite the value ascribed to the compulsory dispute settlement under UNCLOS, the South China Sea Arbitration Case does not resolve the problem between the two countries. Even more complicated, some have blamed the Philippines for triggering the negative reaction from China, which will lead to an uncertain post-arbitration situation. The author raises a question: Is the Philippines’ use of UNCLOS arbitration a genuine attempt to resolve its maritime dispute with China? Or is it merely a political game of international law?