Politics in the De-politicised: TikTok as a Source of China’s Soft Power

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 9, No. 11, November 2021

A person's hands are depicted holding a smartphone featuring the TikTik logo on its screen.

TikTok logo. Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.

Zuza Nazaruk

Last year’s “TikTok war” revealed unprecedented hostility of the US government towards the Chinese tech newcomer. The seemingly innocuous software was developed by ByteDance, a Chinese unicorn companyTikTok is a sister app of Douyin, created for the Chinese market. Both apps allow users to share and watch short videos. In July 2020, then-President Donald Trump accused TikTok of a series of breaches, the most serious of which was sharing user data with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Levine, 2020). Yet, some experts, including Adam Segal from the Council of Foreign Relations, considered the near-ban a smokescreen to hinder the growth of the most globally successful Chinese app to date (Campbell, 2020). In 2020, TikTok was the most downloaded app globally, with 89 million new users just in the US (Geyser, 2021). To date, 23% of Americans use or have watched TikTok, with an average American user having spent 14.3 hours monthly on the app in 2020 (Tankovska, 2021).

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Is The Persecution Of Falun Gong In China Tantamount To Genocide?

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 9, No. 9, September 2021

A yellow destruction vehicle is depicted destroying personal possessions. A small crowd watches from the side.

Destruction of Falun Gong books during the 1999 China crackdown. Wikimedia/ClearWisdom

Helen Hintjens, Ph.D.
International Institute of Social Studies in The Hague

“Genocide is a crime for which there has to be proof of a particular hostile state of mind in an individual or in a government body towards a group that qualifies under the Genocide Convention’s or the ICC Statute’s limited set of groups against whom genocide can be committed”.[1]

Since at least 2000, at the behest of Jiang Zemin, President of the PRC from 1993 to 2003, Falun Gong have been labelled a ‘heretical (or deviated) religion’, and its members systematically persecuted through a covert ‘6-10 Office’ group of Chinese government security officers.

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Perspectives for development of China-EU relations in the infrastructure investment sector: a case study of COVEC’s investment in Poland

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 5, No. 8, August 2017

Polish President Andrzej Duda is photographed exchanging red folders with Chinese President XI Jinping. The Chinese flag is visible in the background.

Polish President Andrzej Duda with Chinese President XI Jinping, 2016. Source: Wikimedia Commons.


Paulina Kanarek
Oxford University

In 2009 China Overseas Engineering Group (COVEC) was the first Chinese company to win a public works contract in a member state of the European Union. Two years later COVEC decided to withdraw from Poland and its failure to construct a section of the A2 motorway between Warsaw and Łódź brought up questions regarding access to the EU’s public procurement market by third countries.

This research explores the implications of COVEC’s investment for bilateral relations between China and Poland. Through analysis of this particular case study of the unsuccessful entrance to the EU infrastructure market, this work attempts to uncover whether the fault lies in the communication gap between European and Chinese actors and zero-sum mentality or it is a case of policy failure.

This study will reveal the particular model of operations that the Chinese companies try to pursue in Europe, basing on their previous experiences in the African construction market. By showing that the model which relies on offering the lowest bid and then renegotiating the contract cannot work due to the European Union’s legal framework and Polish domestic laws, this evidence-based research will argue that COVEC’s investment was a classic example of project management failure.

Furthermore, this research aims at casting light on the broader context of the political economy of China’s relations with the European Union. Following the national interest while adhering to its obligations as a member state of the EU, Poland serves as a good example to show the complexity of relations between the PRC and highly fragmented EU.

Through qualitative research, including elite interviews, this work intends to fill in the gap in academic research on China’s relations with the Central and Eastern European states, assessing whether there is space for progress in China-EU relations in the infrastructure investment sector.

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