Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 3, No.3, March 2015.
New Kabul Bank in Kabul, 2012. An Afghan tribunal convicted two top executives of the Kabul Bank, renamed the New Kabul Bank after the scandal broke, and sentenced them to five-year prison terms on Tuesday for their role in a massive corruption scandal that led to the collapse of Afghanistan’s largest bank and threatened the country’s fragile economy. The bank’s former chairman Sherkhan Farnood and former chief executive officer Khalilullah Ferozi were found guilty of theft of $278 million and $530 million, respectively. Farnood and Ferozi have also been ordered to pay back these funds. Source: Chuck Moravec via Flickr.
Thomas Buonomo
Geopolitical Risk Analyst
Throughout U.S. involvement in counter-insurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, rampant government corruption has driven continuing instability and hampered U.S. nation-building efforts.[1] Corruption was a major reason for the collapse of the Iraqi military in northern Iraq upon impact with the Islamic State.[2] It is also the reason why Afghans are turning to the Taliban for resolution of their legal disputes.[3]
These are profoundly tragic and frustrating outcomes that can only be precluded in the future in one of two ways: the U.S. must either obtain legal authority from the U.N. Security Council—or, in critical situations, through unilateral measures—to override a host nation’s legal system and hold corrupt actors accountable when local officials refuse. Alternatively, should this approach fail, the U.S. government should refrain from nation-building missions entirely and provide the U.S. military with a mission more closely aligned with its core competency: kinetic military operations.
Consideration must be given to contingencies in between these two ends of the spectrum that may call for foreign internal defense or limited counterinsurgency missions. In cases where the U.S. military has overthrown an existing government or is ordered to intervene in a failed state—two scenarios that the U.S. should engage in only with the utmost reluctance and with the maximum application of resources once decided—long-term extra-national legal authority beyond the transition to nominal sovereignty is critical.
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