Category Archives: International Institutions

NATO and Beyond: President Trump Revitalized Our Alliances

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 9, No. 1, January 2021

US President Donald Trump, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi are depicted side by side (in that order) at a meeting during the G20 Osaka Summit in Osaka. Trump and Modi are fist bumping.

US President Donald Trump, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi attend a meeting during the G20 Osaka Summit in Osaka on June 28, 2019. Source: MEAIndia.

William R. Hawkins
Former U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee member

The new NATO 2030: United for a New Era report shows how President Donald Trump has reinvigorated the West’s central international security alliance. It proclaims, “the main characteristic of the current security environment is the re-emergence of geopolitical competition – that is, the profusion and escalation of state-based rivalries and disputes over territory, resources, and values.” This reflects the 2018 National Defense Strategy issued by the U.S. Department of Defense which saw America “emerging from a period of strategic atrophy” into a world of “increased global disorder” where Great Power competition with Russia and China is the major challenge facing the country. By looking at the world as it is, President Trump sent a gale of fresh air into a becalmed foreign policy establishment on both sides of the Atlantic and beyond.

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China Celebrates The Anniversary Of Its “Victory” In The Korean War

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 8, No. 11, November 2020

A black and white image depicts Forces of the Korean People's Army celebrate victory on the battlefield. They all have their arms raised on a hill top.

Forces of the Korean People’s Army celebrate victory on the battlefield, 1953. Source: U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group.

William R. Hawkins
Former U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee member

On October 23, Chinese President Xi Jinping delivered a speech at a major gathering in Beijing to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) entering the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1950. He claimed the purpose of military intervention was to help North Korea resist U.S. aggression. The speech is representative of the kind of propaganda Beijing creates to send messages to audiences both at home and abroad at a time of rising tensions across the Indo-Pacific.

Xi’s speech is not the only event staged to celebrate China’s role in the Korean War. Wang Huning, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, delivered a speech at the opening ceremony of a new exhibit dedicated to the war on October 19. According to state media, Wang’s history ran as follows. On October 19, 1950, as requested by the DPRK, CPV forces crossed the Yalu River to aid the DPRK’s fight in the “War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea” (Beijing’s official name for the conflict). The war lasted until a truce was signed in 1953. A total of 2.9 million CPV soldiers entered the battlefield, and 197,653 died. New films and books are also being released pushing the theme that China was acting to defend Korea from an American invasion, motivated only by a desire to regain peace and stability. Continue reading →

China’s Rise and the Weaponization of Soft and Hard Power: How the U.S., Japan, India and Australia are Responding

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 8, No. 9, September 2020

A cartoon depicts Xi Jinping and Donald Trump in face masks. Their noses are touching and pink hearts can be seen in the background.

Detail from mural of Xi Jinping and Donald Trump in Berlin, Germany in 2020. Source: Yan Bennett.

John Garrick
Charles Darwin University

Yan Bennett
Princeton University

China has now fully weaponized its entire soft power repertoire and dramatically upgraded its military arsenal. The Middle Kingdom is no longer unwilling to openly challenge U.S. global hegemonic supremacy or coerce less powerful nations that do not accede to its will. The shocks caused by the Covid-19 pandemic have unmasked the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ambition to be at the centre of global power, but at the same time, the CCP also faces uncertainty over China’s chances of achieving its 2017 strategic targets set by General Secretary Xi to ‘comprehensively build a moderately prosperous society’ by 2021.

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Proposal For A Global Indigenous Organization

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 8, No. 9, September 2020

Maori Meeting House Te Hono ki Hawaiki. The image focuses on the roof featuring wooden sculptures.

Maori Meeting House Te Hono ki Hawaiki. Source: Tony Hisgett

Susan Cullen-Wetere
Ngati Maniapoto

Bernard Cadogan
DPhil Oxford University

Indigenous peoples and their protecting nation states in the Western group of nations share a common interest in democracy and the rule of law. The norm between them is a collaborative and fiduciary association that escalates race relations out of the infinite misery of grievance politics, and the cycles of rage characterising other race discourses. Both indigenous nations and their protector nations have an interest in building on the strengths of their Treaty systems, and protection mechanisms, and in excluding foreign interference inimical to the relationships they share.

It is proposed that a global indigenous organisation is formed, as a place of intellectual discourse and debate, much as is Chatham House in London, or Clingendael in The Netherlands. Continue reading →

Revisiting Grand Strategy

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Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 8, No. 5, May 2020

A black and white image depicts the General Board of the U.S. Navy meeting in 1932 in Washington D.C. Seven men are depicted sitting around table in suits.

The General Board of the U.S. Navy meets in 1932 in Washington D.C. This board existed as an advisory body to the Secretary of the Navy from 1900-1950, and was involved in long range strategic planning focused on the maritime security component of U.S. grand strategy. Its members included the Chief of Naval Operations, President of the Naval War College, Commandant of the Marine Corps and head of naval intelligence. Source: Naval Historical Center.

John T. Kuehn, Ph.D.
Professor of Military History
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

A recent article in Foreign Affairs by Daniel W. Drezner, Ronald R. Krebs, and Randall Schweller hoisted the white flag: “The End of Grand Strategy: America Must Think Small.”   The article implies that an American attempt to develop a grand strategy, or to support the current grand strategy in vogue, are both vain pursuits.

One reaction to prescriptions of this sort, or rather proscriptions, is to examine what the authors mean exactly by “grand strategy,” what is their definition?

Perhaps their definition is so different from other accepted definitions of this concept that there is no need to worry, maybe they are talking about something else.
After all, this author wrote on the topic ten years ago, bemoaning that the problem was rooted in, although not limited to, a general lack of understanding of the meaning of the term, especially by military professionals in the nation’s service and war colleges.   It might be useful to compare my definition with that consigned to the dust bin by the FA authors.

Carl von Clausewitz has written that as military campaigns proceed, the war as a whole replaces the campaign, and the whole country the theater of operations. In other words, grand strategy is “the next stage,” which encompasses the strategic considerations for “the whole country.”

But the authors argue that, “A grand strategy is a road map for how to match means with ends.”

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