The Three Oppositions: Chinese Dissident Groups Holding Mass Demonstrations Since 2012

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 5, No. 2, February 2017

Falun Gong practitioners are photographed seated cross legged on the floor.

Falun Gong practitioners before the annual July 1 protest march in Victoria Park, Hong Kong, China. Source: Remko Tanis via Flickr.

Tom Stern

As President Donald Trump takes command 28 Years after the Tiananmen Square Massacre in Beijing, there are three prominent groups which are considered by the Communist Party of China (CPC) to be dissident and subversive to its ideals, posing a danger to political stability. Each of these could potentially become the backbone necessary for the expansion of freedoms in China.

  1. the Tuidang Movement, [1]
  2. the New Citizens’ Movement [2], and
  3. the practitioners of Falun Gong [3].

Tuidang Movement

The 退黨運動 (Tuìdǎng yùndòng), or Tuidang movement for short, is one that seeks the abolition of the CPC. Literally meaning “to withdraw from the Communist Party,” its members are bound by their desire to end the corruption tied to the Party. Caylan Ford, in his dissertation “Tradition and Dissent in China: The Tuidang Movement and its Challenge to the Communist Party” notes a key difference between the movement and those before it in that, rather than drawing from western principles and ideals of democracy and free expression, it seeks to act as a mirror to the nation’s idealized past. In its reflexive approach, the movement employs exigent and distinct Chinese language and ways of thought, such as Confucianism. Ironically, Ford also notes that the movement views the Communist ideology as a largely foreign and detrimental one, “which is portrayed as antithetical to true Chinese values, human nature, and universal laws.” Rather than using a geopolitically-charged force behind its espoused arguments, the Tuidang movement draws from both history and morality in its efforts to compel the Chinese public to recognize their unified, and wholly unnecessary, suffering under the Communist Party.

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Overriding Legal Authority in Nation-Building Missions

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 3, No.3, March 2015.

A building is photographed with the words "New Kabul Bank" written on the side.

New Kabul Bank in Kabul, 2012. An Afghan tribunal convicted two top executives of the Kabul Bank, renamed the New Kabul Bank after the scandal broke, and sentenced them to five-year prison terms on Tuesday for their role in a massive corruption scandal that led to the collapse of Afghanistan’s largest bank and threatened the country’s fragile economy. The bank’s former chairman Sherkhan Farnood and former chief executive officer Khalilullah Ferozi were found guilty of theft of $278 million and $530 million, respectively. Farnood and Ferozi have also been ordered to pay back these funds. Source: Chuck Moravec via Flickr.

Thomas Buonomo
Geopolitical Risk Analyst

Throughout U.S. involvement in counter-insurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, rampant government corruption has driven continuing instability and hampered U.S. nation-building efforts.[1] Corruption was a major reason for the collapse of the Iraqi military in northern Iraq upon impact with the Islamic State.[2] It is also the reason why Afghans are turning to the Taliban for resolution of their legal disputes.[3]

These are profoundly tragic and frustrating outcomes that can only be precluded in the future in one of two ways: the U.S. must either obtain legal authority from the U.N. Security Councilor, in critical situations, through unilateral measuresto override a host nation’s legal system and hold corrupt actors accountable when local officials refuse. Alternatively, should this approach fail, the U.S. government should refrain from nation-building missions entirely and provide the U.S. military with a mission more closely aligned with its core competency: kinetic military operations.

Consideration must be given to contingencies in between these two ends of the spectrum that may call for foreign internal defense or limited counterinsurgency missions.  In cases where the U.S. military has overthrown an existing government or is ordered to intervene in a failed statetwo scenarios that the U.S. should engage in only with the utmost reluctance and with the maximum application of resources once decidedlong-term extra-national legal authority beyond the transition to nominal sovereignty is critical.

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Ukraine’s Former President Yanukovych Deposited Billions of USD with China

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 3, No. 2, February 2015.

Viktor Yanukovych shakes hands with Xi Jinping.

According to two independent JPR sources, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, left, deposited billions of dollars before and during his departure from Ukraine in the spring of 2014.

Anders Corr, Ph.D
Publisher of the Journal of Political Risk

Former President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych has deposited billions of dollars with the Chinese, according to two independent sources available to the Journal of Political Risk.

President Yanukovych deposited approximately $1 billion USD with China on either his first or second visit to that country, according to one of the sources. Two large pallets of cash, of approximately $1 billion USD, were delivered to China through Hong Kong.

The other source, which we accessed in April 2014 on a visit to Ukraine, said that President Yanukovych transferred most of his deposits to China prior to departing the country and closing the banks with which he was associated. His bankers fled the country at that time.

When President Yanukovych fled Ukraine for Russia in February 2014, he transferred billions of dollars in a hurry. He and his family closed their four banks, according to our source. President Yanukovych’s men stuffed several vehicles full of cash, and drove them to Russia. What is reported here for the first time is that most of his estimated $32 billion in assets were wired to China, according to our source.

Former President Yanukovych denies having foreign bank accounts.

Update (3/7/2015): An email request for comment to the People’s Bank of China was not returned. The JPR was unable to reach Viktor Yanukovych for comment, though he is thought to reside in Rostov-on-Don, Russia

Anders Corr, Ph.D. is the founder and principal of Corr Analytics. JPR Status: Report, archived 2/28/2015. 

Nationalism, Pastoral Nomadism, and Political Risk to Natural Resource Investments in Mongolia: Case Studies of the Aluminum Corporation of China Limited (Chalco) and Rio Tinto

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 2, No. 6, June 2014.

From right to left, Shaft #1, #2, and #5 at Oyu Tolgoi, a copper mine in extreme southern Mongolia photographed from afar.

From right to left, Shaft #1, #2, and #5 at Oyu Tolgoi, a copper mine in extreme southern Mongolia, 2013. Oyu Tolgoi, also known as Turquoise Hill is a combined open pit and underground mega mine project in Khanbogd in the south Gobi Desert. The site was discovered in 2001 and is being developed as a joint venture between Ivanhoe Mines, Rio Tinto and the Government of Mongolia. The mine is scheduled to begin production in July 2012. The Oyu Tolgoi mining project is the largest financial undertaking in Mongolia’s history and is expected upon completion to account for more than 30% of the country’s gross domestic product. Copper production is expected to reach 450,000 tonnes annually and Gold production is estimated to reach 650,000 ounces per year. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Jamian Ronca Spadavecchia [1]
Founder and President of Oxbow Advisory

Mongolia stands at a critical juncture between the rewards of natural resource development and the challenges of modernization. On the one hand, it offers abundant opportunities in the natural resources sector and is located near growing and resource-starved industrial nations of East Asia. At the same time, the presence of autocratic neighbors impose international instability on this democratic and market-oriented economy.

This article considers two underanalyzed political risks that are necessary for understanding the future of the Mongolian economy: nationalism and pastoral nomadism. In doing so, it proffers an improved analytical framework for resource investors to better assess and mitigate their Mongolia risk.

Finally, the analysis uses selected case studies to demonstrate how nationalism and pastoral nomadism might impact natural resource investment. For nationalism, a study of the proposed acquisition of SouthGobi Resources (SouthGobi) by the Aluminum Corporation of China Limited (Chalco) is offered. The Chalco study is emblematic of the link between nationalism and two dominant trends in Mongolia: resource nationalism and increasing geopolitical risk in the natural resources sector. The section also looks at how pastoral nomadism poses a risk to Oyu Tolgoi, Mongolia’s premier copper and gold mining project, by examining a dispute between Rio Tinto and indigenous communities of Gobi herders that threatened Oyu Tolgoi’s project financing. Continue reading

The New Face of Russia’s Relations with Brazil

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 2, No.5, May 2014.

Defense Minister of Brazil, Celso Amorim, receives his counterpart from Russia, Sergei Shoigu, during bilateral meeting in Brasilia.

Defense Minister of Brazil, Celso Amorim (L), receives his counterpart from Russia, Sergei Shoigu, to bilateral meeting at the Defense Ministry in Brasilia, capital of Brazil, on October 16, 2013. Shoigu’s visit included an attempt to win a $4 billion deal to supply 18 fighter jets.

Matthew Michaelides
Editor of the Journal of Political Risk

Abstract

Bilateral trade, high level personal communication, and military-technical relations between Russia and Brazil have all grown significantly over the past decade. Recent weapons sales to Brazil include a $150 million contract for MI-35 helicopters in 2009 and a 2012 deal for seven Ka-62 helicopters. Moreover, the Russian defense ministry has indicated its intention to increase Russian military capacity in Brazil and Latin America more broadly. This paper examines the causes for the increasing depth of Russian-Brazilian military-technical relations and concludes that informal patronage politics play an essential role in understanding Russian actions. A detailed analysis of contemporary Russian-Brazilian relations and existing theoretical perspectives is provided, as well as a thorough examination of recent Russian arms and equipment sales from the informal patronage politics perspective.

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