Protectionism Won’t Work: Four Alternatives to Canceling Trade Agreements

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 5, No. 12, December 2017

A blue and red cargo ship is photographed at the Yangshan deepwater port.

Yangshan deepwater port. Source: Flickr.

Bhakti Mirchandani

Senior Vice President at An Alternative Investment Management Firm

It’s time to create jobs for displaced manufacturing workers and bolster American competitiveness in four ways: (i) invest in growing fields and tradable economies that draw upon a region’s endemic old industrial skills; (ii) fight the opioid epidemic to avoid further declines in labor force participation; (iii) align universities and local manufacturers to ensure that workers are sufficiently skilled to participate in the local tradable economy; and (iv) encourage–and protect–R&D and entrepreneurship in manufacturing.

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Critical Comments On ‘US Policy Toward China: Recommendations For A New Administration’

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 5, No. 2, February 2017

President Xi Jinping flanked by Chinese soldiers. The President is walking down stairs on a red carpet.

President Xi Jinping flanked by Chinese soldiers. Source: Kremlin via Wikimedia Commons.

James E. Fanell
U.S. Navy (ret)

Below are the critical comments I provided to Dr. Orville Schell, the co-chair of the recent Asia Society and University of California, San Diego report US POLICY TOWARD CHINA: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A NEW ADMINISTRATION. While there are sections of the work that I agree with, I still fundamentally disagree with the overall foundation of the document’s recommendations which I believe are designed to sustain the past 40 year of a policy that promotes unconstrained “engagement” with the PRC.  As such, I’ve gone through the entire document and extracted several statements and paragraphs that I disagree with and a few that I agree with.  While I will provide comments for each specific reference issue, I can summarize my dissent of the report in the following major themes:

1.  Unconstrained Engagement.  Engagement with China is asserted to be the primary goal of US relations with China without providing evidence for that assertion.  Or worse, suggesting things are actually going well, contrary to all objective evidence.

2.  “The Relationship” is the #1 Priorty.  “The relationship” is prioritized as being equal to or more important than U.S national security.  There is no clear articulation that U.S. National security should be the #1 national security priority for the US and that our relationship with China should be judged through that lens, not through the lens of sustaining “the relationship” at all costs.

3.  Do Not Provoke.  America should not “provoke” China, but again, there is no evidence to support why this position will benefit U.S. national security interests.

4.  Dissent Not Welcome.  While I appreciate inclusion of Ambassador Lord’s dissenting opinion on North Korea, clearly the study did not value, or include, dissenting opinions, especially in the Asia-Pacific Regional Security and Maritime Dispute sections.

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Trump’s Unfair Ban:  An Iranian View 

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 5, No. 2, February 2017

An urban landscape is photographed from above. Trees are visible in between buildings.

Tehran. Source: Jabiz Raisdana via Flickr.

Nabi Sonboli
Instituted for Political and International Studies

On January 27, 2017, President Donald Trump signed the Executive Order titled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorists”. The order reflects three critical concerns regarding immigrants and those who come to the US in the new administration: Security, ideology, and contribution. These concerns are valid for any country, but the questions remain, which one of these concerns are legitimate with regards to Iran and Iranians? and what is the main target in this order? 

Cuba’s Roller-Coaster Investment Climate — Not for the Faint-Hearted

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 3, No. 4, April 2015.

A white building with a red roof is photographed in a large, green field. Palm trees are visible in the background.

The Club House at Instituto Superior de Arte. The campus is built on the site of an old golf course that was “reclaimed” after the revolution, 2007. The Cuban government has taken increasingly large steps in recent years toward economic liberalization. Cuba issued a pair of surprising free-market decrees on Thursday Aug. 27, 2010, allowing foreign investors to lease government land for up to 99 years, potentially touching off a golf-course building boom, and loosening state controls on commerce to let islanders grow and sell their own fruit and vegetables. Source: Flickr.

Vito Echevarria 
Freelance Journalist

Attendees of the “Cuba Opportunity Summit” – held on April 1, 2015 by the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania at the NASDAQ Marketsite in New York City – consisted mainly of American companies and entrepreneurs, who are caught up with the gold rush-like fervor over the prospect of finally doing business with Cuba. That island, which has endured a harsh trade embargo imposed by Washington since its takeover by Fidel Castro and his Communist revolution, is perhaps the ultimate frontier market on the planet, since American companies have been forbidden from conducting any trade with that regime for decades.  The one glaring exception has been the opening of food trade, which Bill Clinton allowed before leaving office in 2000. Cuba has since become a multi-million-dollar market for various U.S. agricultural and food products.

President Obama’s December 2014 announcement to normalize U.S. relations with Cuba, which will presumably increase food export opportunities, travel, as well as openings in areas like banking, telecommunications and building supplies, is being viewed in many circles as a process that will ultimately end the ongoing U.S. trade embargo against Cuba. Speakers at the Wharton Cuba Summit, which was covered by CNBC (complete with on-site interviews by its Chief International Correspondent, Michelle Caruso-Cabrera), included top executives from Norwegian Cruise Line, Discovery Networks, Thomas Herzfeld Advisors, and NASDAQ, along with a stream of U.S. government officials (headed by Roberta Jacobson – Asst. Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs – who’s been leading Washington’s negotiations with Cuban officials to normalize diplomatic relations between the two countries), as well as think tanks from the Brookings Institute to the Americas Society. In other words, Cuba has finally “arrived” – receiving long overdue “prime-time” attention in the United States. Even some of the Cuban government officials that showed up were overwhelmed by the attention they were getting from fellow attendees.

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The New Face of Russia’s Relations with Brazil

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 2, No.5, May 2014.

Defense Minister of Brazil, Celso Amorim, receives his counterpart from Russia, Sergei Shoigu, during bilateral meeting in Brasilia.

Defense Minister of Brazil, Celso Amorim (L), receives his counterpart from Russia, Sergei Shoigu, to bilateral meeting at the Defense Ministry in Brasilia, capital of Brazil, on October 16, 2013. Shoigu’s visit included an attempt to win a $4 billion deal to supply 18 fighter jets.

Matthew Michaelides
Editor of the Journal of Political Risk

Abstract

Bilateral trade, high level personal communication, and military-technical relations between Russia and Brazil have all grown significantly over the past decade. Recent weapons sales to Brazil include a $150 million contract for MI-35 helicopters in 2009 and a 2012 deal for seven Ka-62 helicopters. Moreover, the Russian defense ministry has indicated its intention to increase Russian military capacity in Brazil and Latin America more broadly. This paper examines the causes for the increasing depth of Russian-Brazilian military-technical relations and concludes that informal patronage politics play an essential role in understanding Russian actions. A detailed analysis of contemporary Russian-Brazilian relations and existing theoretical perspectives is provided, as well as a thorough examination of recent Russian arms and equipment sales from the informal patronage politics perspective.

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